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Introduction 
 
The Effects of the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor on India-Pakistan 
Relations 
Christian Wagner 
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) constitutes one of the largest foreign 
investments China has made in the framework of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. 
The expenditures planned for the coming years in the amount of approximately $46 
billion will further intensify relations between China and Pakistan. At the same time, 
Pakistan will assume a more prominent role in China’s foreign policy. But CPEC also 
affects relations between India and Pakistan. The transport corridor between Pakistan 
and China traverses Jammu and Kashmir, the status of which has been a subject of con-
tention between India and Pakistan since 1947. This constellation would seem to sug-
gest a negative scenario whereby CPEC could place additional strain on India-Pakistan 
relations. On the other hand, a positive scenario is also conceivable, with a settlement 
of the Kashmir dispute even becoming possible in the long term. 
 
CPEC plays a key role in China’s foreign 
policy, linking infrastructure measures 
aimed at establishing a “New Silk Road” 
(one road) running through Central and 
South Asia with efforts to create a “Mari-
time Silk Road” (one belt) in the Indian 
Ocean. The two routes are to meet in the 
Pakistani port city of Gwadar in the Balo-
chistan Province, the development of which 
China has been promoting for many years. 
Upon completion, CPEC will form a 
network of roads, railways and gas pipe-
lines encompassing approximately 3,000 
kilometers in length. Around $11 billion 
is currently earmarked for infrastructure 
measures. The bulk of the funding, how-
ever, about $33 billion, is slated for energy 
projects. The aim here is to alleviate chronic 
energy shortages, stimulate economic 
development and establish new industrial 
parks. 
The implementation of the CPEC project 
has fueled a series of domestic political 
debates in Pakistan. Initially, a dispute 
arose between the provinces and the politi-
cal parties over the road and railway routes 
between Gwadar in the country’s southwest 
and China in the northeast. This dispute 
has since given way to general agreement 
that there should be several routes ben-
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efitting as many provinces as possible. But 
there is still ongoing debate over whether 
the “western” or the “eastern” route should 
be completed first. A second issue concerns 
the safety of Chinese personnel. There are 
already several thousand Chinese workers 
and experts in Pakistan and this number 
is likely to increase as CPEC proceeds. As 
Chinese are regularly attacked or abducted, 
for example by separatist groups in Balo-
chistan, the army is in the process of de-
ploying a special security division to pro-
tect them. A third issue is the dispute over 
the tax exemptions the Chinese govern-
ment has demanded in return for easing 
credit terms and importing machinery 
from Pakistan. 
CPEC and India-Pakistan Relations 
CPEC will also have consequences for India-
Pakistan relations. The corridor runs 
through the region of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) 
in northern Pakistan. This region belongs 
to Jammu and Kashmir, to which both 
India and Pakistan have asserted claims. 
Since the accession of the former princely 
state to the Indian Union in October 1947, 
New Delhi has claimed the entire area for 
India and insists on resolving the dispute 
only with Islamabad. India invokes the 1972 
Shimla Agreement, according to which dis-
putes between the two countries are to 
be resolved through bilateral negotiation. 
Pakistan, in contrast, invokes a series of 
resolutions on Kashmir in the United 
Nations and views the former princely state 
as disputed territory, the affiliation of which 
is to be decided by referendum. The Kash-
mir dispute has been the cause of three of 
the four wars that India and Pakistan have 
waged against each other since 1947. 
The Negative Scenario 
The aim of CPEC is to improve economic 
development in Pakistan. In recent years, 
economic growth has been weaker than in 
other South Asian countries such as India, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Improved eco-
nomic development could lead to an in-
crease in Pakistan’s military spending. This 
would presumably further fuel the arms 
race with India. So far, efforts to intensify 
economic relations with India have found-
ered on the resistance of Pakistan’s armed 
forces. The political rapprochement con-
nected with the 1999 Lahore process and 
the 2004 Composite Dialogue has been 
undermined by military adventures like the 
1999 Kargil War and major terrorist strikes 
like the 2009 Mumbai attacks. 
A Pakistan economically strengthened by 
Chinese support would have little interest 
in expanding economic cooperation with 
India. Pakistan could then more forcefully 
place the Kashmir dispute on the foreign 
policy agenda, as it did intermittently in 
2014/15. Major terror attacks in India, with 
or without the knowledge of the security 
forces in Pakistan, could lead to an esca-
lation of the Kashmir dispute. This in turn 
would prompt the international community 
to intervene, thereby playing into Pakistan’s 
hands. If in the course of a renewed India-
Pakistan conflict Chinese citizens were to 
be attacked, for example in Balochistan, 
where separatist groups operate, partially 
supported by India, this could also produce 
a crisis between New Delhi and Beijing. 
In this scenario, the economic and politi-
cal effects of CPEC would essentially pro-
long the negative cycle of India-Pakistan 
relations. In this case the positive economic 
effects that CPEC would have for Pakistan 
would spur a military build-up, which in 
turn would have negative effects on rela-
tions with India. 
The Positive Scenario 
On the other hand, a positive scenario is 
also conceivable in which CPEC exerts a 
moderating influence on India-Pakistan 
relations and the Kashmir dispute. In 
concrete terms, this would have an effect 
on the constitutional status of the Gilgit-
Baltistan region in Pakistan, on the one 
hand, and on relations between China, 
Pakistan and India on the other. 
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As one would expect, the routing of the 
corridor through Gilgit-Baltistan, which is 
claimed by India, has prompted protests by 
the government in New Delhi. Gilgit-Baltis-
tan has a special status in Pakistan. As it is 
part of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan offi-
cially considers it disputed territory and 
therefore refuses to accord it the rights of 
a province. 
The special status of Gilgit-Baltistan has 
repeatedly led to protests by the local popu-
lation, who demand more political partici-
pation and investments. Due to its strategic 
significance, the region is de facto con-
trolled by the armed forces. Various Kash-
miri rebel groups, which are supported by 
the armed forces in their fight against 
India, are said to run training camps here. 
Pakistani governments have improved 
regional self-government through a series 
of reforms. As part of the last major reform 
in 2009, the former Northern Areas, among 
other areas, were renamed Gilgit-Baltistan. 
At the same time a legislative assembly was 
established in the region, which in contrast 
to provincial parliaments has only limited 
powers. The most recent elections in Gilgit-
Baltistan in the summer of 2015 yielded a 
majority for the Pakistan Muslim League – 
Nawaz (PML-N), which governs in Islamabad. 
Were CPEC to improve Pakistan’s eco-
nomic development, this could foment dis-
content in Gilgit-Baltistan over the growing 
gap between the region and other provinces. 
If the government were to respond to such 
protests by constitutionally upgrading 
the region to a province, it would simulta-
neously be undermining its own official 
stance in the Kashmir dispute, since as a 
province of Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan would 
no longer be a “disputed territory”. The 
dispute with India would thus be indirectly 
ended, as both sides would have then com-
pleted the integration of the respective 
parts of Kashmir controlled by them into 
their state entities. 
The second positive aspect of CPEC lies 
in the effects it could have on relations 
between and among China, Pakistan and 
India. The relationship with China has been 
extolled for many years as extremely posi-
tive and described in metaphorical circum-
locutions such as “higher than the Hima-
layas and deeper than the ocean”. In formal 
terms, moreover, Pakistan is China’s only 
strategic partner, though closer analysis 
shows that China is not the unconditionally 
reliable partner that Pakistan hopes for, 
above all in the dispute with India. 
First of all, China does not support Pakis-
tan’s position on the Kashmir issue. Pakistan 
wants to resolve the matter through inter-
nationalization. China, in contrast, along 
with the US and the EU, among others, 
believes that the dispute should be resolved 
through bilateral talks. This stance cor-
responds to India’s position. Second, during 
the 1999 Kargil War Beijing was not willing 
to stand with Pakistan against India. Third, 
at the 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
negotiations, which took place in the 
framework of the US-India Civil Nuclear 
Agreement, China voted for Indian exemp-
tions that were heavily criticized in Pakis-
tan. Fourth, India-China relations have 
improved considerably since the 1990s. 
The bilateral relationship continues to be 
marked by tensions, stemming for example 
from the unresolved border issue in the 
Himalayas. Nevertheless, the two countries 
have significantly expanded their political 
and economic cooperation in recent years, 
for example through participation in the 
BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
South Africa). In international negotiation 
rounds they regularly agree on common 
positions vis-à-vis the West. The accession 
of India (and Pakistan) to the Shanghai Co-
operation Organisation (SCO) will strengthen 
cooperation between New Delhi and Beijing 
even further. 
As mentioned above, China’s participa-
tion in CPEC increases its vulnerability due 
to its substantial investments and the dan-
ger posed to its own citizens in the even-
tuality of renewed India-Pakistan hostilities. 
But as China’s cooperation with Pakistan is 
focused on its armed forces rather than its 
political parties, China’s influence could 
have a moderating effect on Pakistan’s mili-
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tary. Military adventures like the 1999 
Kargil War would thus become less likely. 
Conclusions 
Pakistan places high economic hopes in 
CPEC. To what extent the project can really 
be carried out remains unclear. There has 
always been a gap between official an-
nouncements and the funds actually spent 
on Chinese projects in Pakistan. Never-
theless, in the medium to long-term CPEC 
is likely to have a positive effect on the 
economic development of the country, for 
example by contributing to improving 
Pakistan’s infrastructure and easing its 
chronic energy shortage. 
CPEC strengthens the strategic alliance 
between Pakistan and China. At first glance, 
it would therefore seem likely to exacerbate 
the dispute between Pakistan and India. But 
in Pakistan, too, there is a change of think-
ing taking place. For example, in Islamabad 
there is a growing understanding that sup-
porting militant groups in order to achieve 
foreign policy objectives in neighboring 
countries such as India and Afghanistan is 
increasingly counterproductive and has 
negative effects on Pakistan’s national secu-
rity. Moreover, China nourishes hopes that 
CPEC and its economic effects will also 
contribute to the transformation of Pakis-
tani society and the strengthening of 
moderate forces. China reasons that peace-
ful development in Pakistan could in turn 
also have a positive influence on the region, 
for example with regard to the situation in 
Afghanistan. 
Securing Chinese trade routes by grant-
ing Gilgit-Baltistan the constitutional status 
of a province would codify the status quo, 
thus indirectly bringing the Kashmir dis-
pute to an end and closing a chapter in 
global politics. India has already signaled 
in previous negotiations with Pakistan, for 
example in 2007, that it is willing to accept 
the status quo in Kashmir, which evinces 
the current division of the territory. 
After all there is still a possibility, how-
ever unlikely, that India may one day en-
dorse the internationalization of the Kash-
mir dispute and a referendum. Were 
Kashmiris to then vote in favor of accession 
to the Indian Union, CPEC would become 
obsolete overnight. 
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